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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION:

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over the final
agency action in this case pursuant to Utah Code Annotated sections
78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1990) (Court of Appeals Jurisdiction), 63-46b16 (1989) (Administrative Procedures Act - Judicial Review - Formal
Adjudicative Proceedings), and 61-1-23 (Supp. 1990) (Utah Uniform
Securities Act - Review of Orders).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW:

The Respondents1 believe that the Statement of the Issues
contained in the Brief of Petitioners (hereinafter "Petitioners'
Brief") is impermissibly vague2 and contains erroneous standards
of review. The Respondents therefore offer the following statement
of the issues and the standards of review:
Issue I:

Based upon the record as a whole, was there

*The Division of Securities (hereinafter the "DivisionM) and
the Department of Commerce (hereinafter the "Department of
Commerce") of the State of Utah (hereinafter collectively referred
to as the "Respondents").
2

Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Administrative Procedure
does not specify any requirements for the statement of the issues,
but it stands to reason that the issues should be at least as well
defined in the brief as they are in the docketing statement. Rule
9(c)(5) states, with regard to docketing statements, that
"[gjeneral conclusions . . . are not acceptable," yet the Statement
of Issues contained in the Petitioners' Brief consists of nothing
but general conclusions. See, Petitioners' Brief at 1-3.

1

substantial evidence to support the Division's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law?
Standard of review:

Agency determinations of fact are only

overturned if, after marshalling all of the evidence supporting the
findings, the party challenging the findings can establish that the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence, which is such
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.

Grace Drilling v. Board of Review of the Industrial

Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).
should not substitute its

This court

judgment as between two reasonably

conflicting views, but rather should uphold the agency's findings.
Id.

An agency's conclusions of law concern the application of

findings of fact to the law, and are therefore mixed questions of
fact and law, which should not be disturbed on appeal unless the
agency's "determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality."

Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review of the

Industrial Commission of Utah, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App. 1989).
Issue II:

Is there an unconstitutional conflict between the

Divisions' enforcement of its U.S.A. Medical Stop Trading Order and
the Johnson's obligations under NASD3 rules?
Standard of review: This is a mixed question of law and fact,
requiring a factual determination of the Johnsons' situation and
how that situation is affected by Utah law and NASD rules. Due to
the technical nature of the question, this court should uphold the

3

The National Association of Securities Dealers, a selfregulating organization that governs over the counter stock
brokerages.
It is monitored by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC").
2

agency's position if that position is reasonable and rational.
Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 767
P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988) ("Issues of mixed law and fact are often
illuminated

by

an

agency's

expertise,

and

special

technical

knowledge may be of particular help in determining whether the
facts fall within the meaning of statutory terms.") See also,

Vali

Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care
Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 443 (Utah App. 1990) ("For
facts,' mixed questions of

law and

'ultimate

fact, interpretations of

'special law' or the agency's own regulations, and a host of other
matters between the 'pure fact' and 'general law' extremes, we
apply an 'intermediate standard,' according the agency decision
some deference and affirming the disposition if it is reasonable
and rational"); Pro-Benefit Staffing, 775 P.2d at 442 ("reasonable
and rational" standard applies to mixed questions of law and fact
under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act).
Issue III:

Did the Respondents err procedurally with regard

to the Petitioners'(hereinafter referred to collectively as the
"Johnsons"M many motions?
Standard of review: The narrow question of whether the agency
erred procedurally is a straight question of law, and is governed
by the correction-of-error standard.

In resolving this issue,

however, the Court will have to review a number of conclusions of

4

T?here is often little reason to distinguish between the two
Petitioners for purposes of this brief, hence the term "Johnsons"
is used to refer to both Petitioners.
Where reference to a
specific Petitioner is necessary, Marlen Vernon Johnson is referred
to as "Marlen Johnson," while Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. is
referred to as "Johnson-Bowles."

3

law and other mixed questions of law and fact, which are correctly
reviewed under the "reasonable and rational" standard. Hurley. 767
See also,

P.2d at 527.

Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions.

797 P.2d at 443; Pro-Benefit Staffing, 775 P.2d at 442.
Issue IV:

Was the Division's U.S.A. Medical Stop Trading

Order valid at the time when the Johnsons purchased U.S.A. Medical
stock?
Standard of review: This is a mixed question of law and fact,
requiring a factual determination of status of the Stop Trading
Order and the application of federal laws to the state. Due to the
technical nature of the question, this court should uphold the
agency's position if that position is reasonable and rational.
Hurley, 767 P.2d at 527.

See also,

Vali Convalescent and Care

Institutions, 797 P.2d at 443; Pro-Benefit Staffing, 775 P.2d at
442.
Issue

V.

Was

an

Order

that

registration with the Division

suspended

the

Johnsons'

for one year and placed

the

Johnsons' on probation for two years thereafter unreasonable in
light of the severity and willful nature of the Johnsons' conduct?
Standard of review:

This is an issue of agency discretion,

and this court should limit its review to the question of abuse of
discretion.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(i) (1989).

LIST
OF
CONSTITUTIONAL
REGULATIONS AND RULES:

PROVISIONS,

STATUTES,

ORDINANCES.

For the sake of consistency, all constitutional provisions,

4

statutes, ordinances, regulations, rules and materials from NASD or
NASAA5 have been reproduced as Exhibit MAM in the addendum to this
brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

The Nature of the Case:

This is a case where Johnson-Bowles, a securities brokerdealer, and Marlen Johnson, a securities agent, encouraged the
Division of Securities to place a Stop Trading Order on the stock
of IKS.A. Medical, and then knowingly violated, and helped others
to violate, that Stop Trading Order by purchasing U.S.A. Medical
stock from Utah residents for over $506,000 less than the Johnsons
believed the stock would have cost before the Stop Trading Order
made sales of the securities illegal.

Because the Johnsons' acts

of knowingly violating, and helping others to violate, the Stop
Trading Order constituted dishonest and unethical practices in the
securities

business,

the

Division,

after

a

complete

formal

administrative procedure, suspended the Johnsons' licenses for one
year and placed the Johnsons on an additional two years probation.

The Facts of the Case:

5

The North American Securities Administrator's Association, an
organization comprised of securities regulators at the state level
(including people from the Utah Division of Securities).
5

The Respondents believe that the Petitioners have conveniently
ignored

a number

of key

facts, including

admissions

by the

Petitioners and findings by Federal Judge J. Thomas Greene, that
influenced the Division's decision in this matter. Therefore, the
Respondents will set forth a complete set of facts that they deem
relevant to this case:
1.

At all times relevant to this case, Johnson-Bowles was

registered with the Division as a broker-dealer, and Marlen Johnson
was registered as an agent.

(Stipulation of Facts for Purposes of

Hearing, R.1154-1158, I 1 at R.1154 (hereinafter "Stipulation of
Facts"); Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order In re:
Johnson-Bowles and Marlen Johnson, R.1129-1142, I 1 at R.1129-1130
(hereinafter "Findings, Conclusions and Order")).
2.

As of January 22, 1989, Johnson-Bowles was

exactly 53,500 shares of U.S.A. Medical stock.

"short6"

(Stipulation of

Facts, I 2 at R.1155; Findings, Conclusions, and Order, I 2 at
R.1130.)
3.
purchased

Of the 53,500 shares, 38,500 shares were deliberately
"short" by Johnson-Bowles, with the remaining 15,000

shares representing a sell order placed by a customer through
Johnson-Bowles but not covered by the customer.

(Complaint for

Securities Fraud and Declaratory Relief in the case of JohnsonBowles Company v. U.S.A. Medical Corporation, et al., #89-C-157-G

6

Being "short" means that Johnson-Bowles had been paid by
other people for stock that it had not delivered. In order to
cover the "short" position, Johnson-Bowles would have to buy an
equal amount of stock and deliver it to the parties that had
already paid Johnson-Bowles.
6

(D. Utah Feb. 16, 1989) (hereinafter "Johnsons' Federal ComplaintM
and "Johnsons' Federal Lawsuit"), at 9.7)
4.

On January 23, 1989, U.S.A. Medical stock underwent a 10

for 1 forward split8, and thereafter the price per share increased
approximately tenfold, to approximately $1.00 per share of postsplit stock.

(Stipulation of Facts, II 3-4 at R.1155; Findings,

Conclusions and Order, I 2 at R.1130)).
5.

At a price of approximately $1.00 per share, the Johnsons

would have had to pay approximately $535,000 to purchase enough
stock to clear their short position.
6.

On or about February 6, 1989, Otra Clearing House, one of

the parties

to whom

Johnson-Bowles

owed stock, informed the

Johnsons that it had "bought-in"9 the 150,000 shares Johnson-Bowles
owed it, at a price of 10£ per share.

On February 15, 1989, the

Johnsons wrote a letter to Otra Clearing House that said "JohnsonBowles Company, Inc., considers U.S.A. Medical Corp., common stock

7

Johnsons' Federal Complaint, and a complete transcript of the
preliminary injunction hearing in that case, were entered as
exhibits in the instant administrative hearing, see Reporter's
Transcript of Proceedings Before the Securities Division In Re
Johnson-Bowles and Marlen Johnson (July 16, 1990) (hereinafter
"Hearing Transcript"), R.860-1111, at R.861, were relied upon by
the Division in its decision making process, and are a part of the
record in this case, although not separately numbered (the
documents are in a manila file folder, along with other documents
that were entered into evidence at the Division's Hearing).
leaning that each old share of U.S.A. Medical was replaced by
10 new shares of post-split stock. After the split, Johnson-Bowles
was short 535,000 shares of new U.S.A. Medical stock.
9,,

Buying-in" is a normal practice in the securities industry.
When party "A" fails to deliver stock that it owes to party "B"
within a given period of time, then party "B" may "buy-in" the
stock by purchasing it from some other source "CM and charging
party "A" the purchase price.

7

to be unregistered
participate
securities."

in

an

securities.
unlawful

We choose not to engage or
distribution

of

unregistered

(Letter of 15 February 1989, Hearing Before the

Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the State of
Utah (hereinafter "Hearing") Exhibit P-210; Findings, Conclusions,
and Order, M
7.

3-4 at R.1130.)

The next day, on February 16, 1989, Johnson-Bowles filed

the Johnsons' Federal Lawsuit.

See, Johnson-Bowles Company v.

U.S.A. Medical Corporation, et al., #89-C-157-G (D. Utah Feb. 16,
1989).

In the Complaint, Johnson-Bowles alleges that it "believes

and asserts that there is no exemption for any U.S.A. Medical
shares trading in interstate commerce," that it "is fearful of
honoring

its

commitments

with

the

numerous

Broker-Dealer

Defendants, including either taking delivery of stock or otherwise
delivering such itself, as it does not want to aid and abet, or
otherwise participate or engage in an unlawful distribution of
unregistered securities, namely, the securities of U.S.A. Medical,"
and that "there is no exemption for the shares of U.S.A. Medical
trading in interstate commerce."

(Johnsons' Federal Complaint, at

13, 13, and 26 respectively; Findings, Conclusions and Order, I 5
at R.1131.)
8.

On February 17, 1989, United States District Court Judge

J. Thomas Greene granted Johnson-Bowles motion for a temporary
restraining order preventing Midwest Clearing from buying-in U.S.A.

10

This document, like the Johnsons' Federal Lawsuit documents
and all of the other documents that were introduced into evidence
at the Hearing, is part of the record in this case, is in the
manila file folder, and has not been separately paginated.
8

Medical stock on Johnson-Bowies' account.

(Stipulation of Facts,

1 6 at R.1155; Findings, Conclusions and Order, I 6 at R.1131.)
9.

Judge Greene held a preliminary injunction hearing on

February 27 and 28 concerning Johnson-Bowles' motion to enjoin
further buy-ins against it. At that hearing, a number of witnesses
testified for Johnson-Bowles, including Marlen Johnson.

At the

conclusion of the hearing Judge Greene ruled from the bench against
Johnson-Bowles and subsequently

entered, on March 1, 1989, a

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, which read in
part, as follows:11
2. The Court finds that the stock of U.S.A. Medical
was unlawfully issued, has never been registered with any
proper regulatory authority, is not exempt from such
requisite registration and has been and is continuing to
be traded illegally.
3.
The stock of U.S.A. Medical has been and
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price
of that stock in violation of the securities laws.
4. The Court finds, however, that the plaintiff,
Johnson-Bowles, knew or should have known about the
alleged irregularities as to non-registration, non-exempt
status and illegal trading in the stock after it became
a market maker, and is charged with knowledge of these
irregularities.
5. The Court finds that relative burden between
Johnson-Bowles and other parties as well as damage to the
public interest has not been shown by a preponderance of
the evidence and that there is a failure of burden of
proof to establish those elements.
(Judge Greene's Findings of Fact, etc., Hearing Exhibit R-3, at 6;
Findings, Conclusions and Order, I 6 at 1131-1132.)
10.

Judge Greene did not rule on the issue of whether

n

The order was apparently prepared from a transcript of Judge
Green's oral ruling; the two are almost identical. See, Johnsons'
Federal Lawsuit transcript at 2-263 through 2-264.
9

Johnson-Bowles was required to buy-in U.S.A. Medical stock, though
he did rule that the stock lacked either registration or exemption
and was being traded illegally. Judge Greene stayed the case as to
all NASD members, and he ordered that all NASD members submit their
claims to arbitration.

(Judge Greene's Findings of Fact, etc.,

Hearing Exhibit R-3, at 7.)
11.
Division

On the same day that Judge Greene entered his Order, the
of

Availability

Securities

entered

of Exemptions

its

Summary

from Registration

"Temporary Stop Trading Order").

Order

Denying

(hereinafter the

(Temporary Stop Trading Order,

R.290-294; Stipulation of Facts, J 9 at 1156; Findings, Conclusions
and Order, I 7 at 1132.)

That Order was made final by the

Division's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Order
of March 27, 1989 (hereinafter the "Permanent Stop Trading Order").
(Permanent Stop Trading Order, R.1164-1168; Stipulation of Facts,
I 9 at R.1156; Findings, Conclusions and Order, f 9 at R.1133.)
(Because the two operate together, with no gap in coverage, the
Temporary

and Permanent

Stop Trading Orders are

collectively

referred to herein as the "Stop Trading Order.") The Stop Trading
Order denied U.S.A. Medical stock the benefit of any exemptions
from Utah stock registration requirements, thereby making trading
in the stock illegal in Utah.12

The Johnsons had actual knowledge

of both the Stop Trading Order and the Default Order at the time of
issuance.

(Stipulation of Facts, f 11 at R.1156; Findings,

12

This was the conclusion of law reached by the Securities
Advisory Board.
See, Findings, Conclusions and Order, at 8-9,
R.1136-1137.
10

Conclusions and Order, f 9 at 1133.)
12.

On March 1, 1989, Otra Clearing House completed its buy-

in of 150,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical stock, but at a price of 70*
per share.

(Letter of Marlen Johnson to Ken Schaeffer of NASD,

Hearing Exhibit P-l, at 4; Findings, Conclusions and Order, I 7 at
R*1132.)

There is nothing in the record that clearly establishes

whether Otra Clearing House made its buy-in before the Division
issued its Stop Trading Order (or before Otra became aware of the
Order).
13.

On March 6, 1989, the United States Securities and

Exchange Commission

issued a ten day Order of Suspension of

Trading, which stopped trading in U.S.A. Medical stock nationwide.
That order, by its terms, expired at 11:59 p.m. EST on March 15,
1989.

(SEC Order of Suspension of Trading, R.1169; Stipulation of

Facts, f 10 at R.1156; Findings, Conclusions and Order, I 8 at
R.1132.)
14.

During the month of March, 1989,13 at a time when the

Johnsons were aware of the U.S.A. Medical Stop Trading Order, the
Johnsons purchased 397,900 shares of U.S.A. Medical stock from six
Utah Residents and one New York resident.

(Stipulation of Facts,

If 12-14, 16, at R.1156-1157; Findings, Conclusions and Order, 1
10, R.1133.) The Johnsons engaged in this transaction even though

l3

0r perhaps mid-April. Although the parties stipulated to the
March date, R.1156, on the witness stand Marlen Johnson was unable
to pinpoint a date, and had to admit that the transactions may not
have closed until mid-April, based on when Johnson-Bowles paid for
the stock. Hearing Transcript at 171-174. The Respondents argued
at the hearing, and argue now, that the Johnsons waited long enough
for the Division's Stop Trading Order to have the effect of
severely depressing prices before illegally purchasing the stock.
11

they had been advised by legal counsel that it was illegal for them
to do so.

(Hearing Transcript, at 151-153; Johnsons' Federal

Lawsuit Transcript, at 2-219 through 2-220.)

Further, Marlen

Johnson later admitted to an employee of the Division that he knew
at

the

time

he made

them

that

the

contravention of the Stop Trading Order.

purchases

would

be

in

(Hearing Transcript, at

R.890, R.893.)
15.

The difference in price between the price at which the

Johnsons sold the stock short and the price at which they illegally
purchased the stock yielded the Johnsons a net profit of $6,538.
(Hearing Transcript, at R.1045; Findings, Conclusions and Order, I
13 at R.1134-1135.) According to the Johnsons' own accountant, if
the stock had been bought-in at the pre-Stop Trading Order price of
70£ per share, the Johnsons would have lost approximately $500,000.
(Hearing Transcript, at R.1139.) Thus, the Johnsons benefitted by
approximately $506,538 as a result of illegally purchasing shares
in violation of the Stop Trading Order.
16. On March 21, 1989, Marlen Johnson, on behalf of JohnsonBowles, wrote a letter to Ken Schaeffer of the National Association
of Securities Dealers

("NASD"), in which he reiterated Judge

Greene's findings "that the stock in U.S.A. Medical was unlawfully
issued, has never been registered with any proper regulatory
authority, is not exempt from such requisite registration and has
been and is continuing to be traded illegally."

(Letter of March

21, 1989, Hearing Exhibit P-l, at 1.) The Johnsons' letter went on
to complain about the March 1st Otra buy-in, and explained the
Johnsons' position as to the legality of trading in U.S.A. Medical
12

stocks
It is Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.fs position that
these buy-ins were illegal. First, shares of stock in
U.S.A. Medical Corp. were unlawfully issued, were never
lawfully registered and do not qualify for any valid
exemption under federal or state law.
As such, any
trading of or transaction involving U.S.A. Medical stock
has been, would have been and is unlawful under Section
5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 USC § 77e, and
Section 10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15
USC S 78j(b).
Second, all open trades or outstanding contracts for
the purchase or sale of shares of stock in U.S.A. Medical
Corp. are illegal contracts and therefore unenforceable.
The enforcement or performance of any and all such open
trades or contracts would constitute and serve to
complete illegal trades and unenforceable contracts.
This would violate securities laws.
(Hearing Exhibit P-l, at 4; Findings, Conclusions and Order, 5 8 at
R.1132-1133.)

The Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:

The Division instigated this action by filing two Notices of
Agency Action with attached petitions, one against Johnson-Bowles
(R.280-289) and one against Marlen Johnson (R.263-273). An Amended
Petition,

consolidating

and

subsequently filed (R.161-169.)

simplifying

the

actions,

was

Thereafter, there were numerous

motions filed, several of which were cited as grounds for appeal
and are discussed at length below. A hearing was held on July 16,
1990, before the Securities Advisory Board (Hearing Transcript,
R.860-1115).
issued

its

(Findings,

On August 10, 1990, the Securities Advisory Board
Findings

of Fact, Conclusions

Conclusions

and

Order,

of Law and

R.1129-1142.)

That

Order.
order

suspended the Johnsons' registration for one year and placed them
13

on an additional two years of probation.

After an agency review,

the Director of the Department of Commerce, David Buhler, issued an
Order on Review on October 29, 1990, which affirmed the Division's
Order.

(Order on Review, R.830-842.)

This appeal follows.

A SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT:

This is a simple license suspension case masquerading as a
complex securities law case.

The Division of Securities lawfully

issued an order stopping all Utah trading in the stock of U.S.A.
Medical Corporation.

Johnson-Bowles, a Utah broker-dealer, and

Marlen Johnson, a Utah registered agent, violated the Stop Trading
Order by purchasing U.S.A. Medical stock from six Utah sellers.
That direct, willful violation of the Division's order by the
Johnsons constituted dishonest and unethical conduct, for which the
Johnsons were properly suspended, following a lawful and correct
administrative proceeding. Despite the Johnsons' assertions to the
contrary, the Division's enforcement of its stop trading order was
not in conflict with NASD rules, and the Johnsons could have abided
by the Division's order without risking NASD sanctions for failure
to purchase stock (in part because there are no sanctions for
failing to purchase stock).

THE ARGUMENT;

Point I:

Based Upon the Record as a Whole, There is More than
14

Substantial Evidence to Support the Division's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:

The Findings

of Fact are supported

by substantial

evidence.

As noted in the issues and standards of review section of this
brief, the Johnsons have the burden in this case to nmarshall

all

of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence."
Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68 (emphasis in original). Instead of
meeting their burden, the Johnsons carefully selected the facts
that they felt supported their case, and conveniently neglected to
marshall many of the key facts relied upon by, and often even
quoted in, the Findings of Fact.

For example, the Petitioners'

Brief fails to mention many of the admissions that the Johnsons
made that they knew trading in U.S.A. Medical stock was illegal.
Because the Johnsons failed to marshall all of the evidence, this
Court should ignore their claims that the Findings of Fact are
flawed.
If the Johnsons had marshalled all of the evidence, it would
be clear that all of the key Findings of Fact are supported by
sufficient evidence. The following table references each important
Finding of Fact and shows some of the evidence that supports each
Finding:14

14

This list is not meant to be exclusive. A more thorough
listing of the evidence can be found in the Facts of this Case
section of the brief. The Stipulation of Facts can be found at
15

1

'

d

Finding #

References to Supporting Evidence

|

1

Stip. of Facts, f 1

1

Stip. of Facts, I 2

|

Stip. of Facts, I 8; Hearing Exhibit P-2

1

Hearing Exhibit P-4

1

Johnsons' Federal Complaint, at 13, 26

f

Stip. of Facts, I 6; Hearing Exhibit R-3, at 6

|

Stip. of Facts, I 9; Hearing Exhibit P-l, at 4

|

Stip. of Facts, I 10; Hearing Exhibit P-l, at 4

|

Stip. of Facts, If 9, 11

I

Stip. of Facts, II 12-14, 16

1

Hearing Transcript, R.1045

|

2
13
14

1
16
8
19
110
1
5

7

| 13

The foregoing table, and the Facts of the Case section of this
brief, conclusively show that there was more than substantial
evidence to support each Finding of Fact.

The Conclusions

of Law are Reasonable

and

Rational.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in this
case was entered by the Securities Advisory Board, a body that is
expert in the area of securities law,15 and approved by the then
R.1154-1158. Findings of Fact 11, 12, 14, and 15 are not included
in the table because the Respondents do not believe that they are
very important for purposes of upholding the Division's Order.
Respondents assert that there is adequate evidence to support those
four findings, however, and that the Petitioners, having failed to
marshall the evidence (or even assert any flaw) with regard to
those findings should be estopped from challenging them.
15

The Securities Advisory Board is composed of five members:
Two from the securities brokerage community with at least five
years experience in securities, one member of the securities
section of the Utah State Bar, one officer or director of a

16

Director of the Division of Securities, John Baldwin, and then
affirmed by the Director of the Department of Commerce, David L.
Buhler. The Conclusions of law require the application of facts to
the law in the highly specialized area of securities law. As mixed
questions of fact and law, the Conclusions of Law should be upheld
unless they are unreasonable. Hurley. 767 P.2d at 527 ("Issues of
mixed law and fact are often illuminated by an agency's expertise,
and special technical knowledge may be of particular help in
determining whether the facts fall within the meaning of statutory
terms.").
The Johnsons have failed to show that the Conclusions of Law
are unreasonable. Indeed, they have failed to directly analyze and
critique the Conclusions of Law, other than to say that the finding
of fact on which they are based lack substantial evidence, a point
which

was

disposed

of

above.16

The Court

should

therefore

summarily affirm the Conclusions of Law.
While the Respondents refuse to do the Johnsons' work for them

corporation affected by Utah securities laws, and one member of the
public at large. Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-18.5(2) (1989).
16

The Johnson do assert, in cursory style, that the Division
offered no evidence that the Johnsons' sellers lacked exemption
from registration. Nonsense. The Stop Trading Order, which denied
the availability of all transactional exemptions, constitutes prima
facia evidence that no exemption existed, as did Judge Greene's
findings. In light of the Stop Trading Order and Judge Greene's
findings, it was the Johnsons' burden to show what exemption they
relied upon; needless to say, they have never identified any such
^exemption. In light of the numerous assertions by the Johnsons
that no exemption existed, the Johnsons should now be estopped from
claiming that one did. Indeed, even if an exemption did exist that
made the trades legal, the Johnsons would still be guilty of
dishonest and unethical conduct if they traded in stock that, by
their own repeated admissions, they fully believed was not exempt.

17

by analyzing every statement in the Conclusions of Law against
every possible attack, there are a few key conclusions that warrant
the Court's attention.
The Conclusions of Law begin (after identifying the Johnsons'
alleged defenses) by reviewing the Division's statutory authority.
See,

Findings, Conclusions and Order, at R.1136.

Utah Code

Annotated section 61-1-6(1) (1989) is quoted for the proposition
that the Division may suspend the registration of a broker-dealer
or agent who has "engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in
the securities business."

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1)(g) (1989).

Section 61-1-7 is quoted to show that " [i]t is unlawful for any
person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it is
registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is
exempted under Section 61-1-14."

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1989).

Although the point apparently baffles the Johnsons, common sense
dictates that willfully purchasing a security that you know cannot
legally be sold constitutes a dishonest or unethical practice in
the securities business.17

17

The Johnsons assert that they were found to have "aided and
abetted" in a legal sense, and then assert that they could not have
done so. That is not the case. The Johnsons were sanctioned for
having participated in, and encouraged (by buying the stock) a
securities transaction that they knew was illegal.
Even if the Divisions' case rested solely on the "aiding and
abetting" theory, there is ample support for that theory. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) states that "[e]very person, acting
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who
directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as
a party for such conduct." Contrary to the Johnsons' assertions,
as the following paragraphs of this brief demonstrate, the Stop
Trading Order did not merely seek to protect the Johnsons (or other
purchasers) from themselves; the order was entered to protect the
18

The Securities Advisory Board then entered a key Conclusion of
Law with regard to the proper scope of a Stop Trading Order:
The proper scope and operative effect of the March
1, 1989 Order entered by the Division was to prohibit any
trading of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities within
this state.
Since those securities were neither
registered nor exempt from registration and had been
traded in a fraudulent scheme designed to manipulate the
price of those securities, the just-stated order was duly
entered to protect the public interest. It is specious
to argue, as [the Johnsons] assert, that the order only
prohibited the sale of U.S.A. Medical Corporation
securities.
Given the unlawful issuance of those
securities and that the subsequent trading of those
securities was tainted by fraudulent and manipulative
practices, the proper scope of the March 1, 1989 Order
must be broadly interpreted and in a manner consistent
with the purpose for the issuance of that order.
Findings, Conclusions, and Order, at R.1136-1137.
expertise

of

the

Securities

Advisory

Board,

Given the

including

two

experienced members of the Utah brokerage community, this Court
should defer to the reasonable and rational conclusion that an
order denying the effectiveness of exemptions from registration is
clearly interpreted by the Utah brokerage community as a Stop
Trading Order that prohibits any trading whatsoever.
The next key conclusion of law states that the Johnsons
. . . purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation Securities
after March 1, 1989 with knowledge that a sale of those
securities would constitute a violation of the March 1,
1989 Order.
Such conduct clearly constitutes a
"dishonest or unethical practice" within the meaning of
Section 61-1-6(1) (g) and provides a sufficient basis upon
which to enter a disciplinary sanction as to [the

public.at large and to prohibit any more trades in tainted stock.
The Johnsons, by willfully encouraging and aiding others to sell
stock to them in violation of the Stop Trading Order and Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-7 (1989), aided and abetted those violations, and under
Utah law is liable as a principle. (Willfulness is the mental
state required for a criminal prosecution under the Utah Uniform
Securities Act. Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-21 (1989).)
19

Johnsons'] registration.
Findings, Conclusions and Order, at R.1137-1138.

This Conclusion

of Law is again a result of the application of expertise in the
area of securities law to the facts of this case. It is reasonable
and rational.

If the conduct was not of a type that is viewed as

clearly and unambiguously dishonest and unethical in the industry,
it is hard to imagine how two members of the brokerage community
and a member of the securities section of the Utah Bar could feel
comfortable

signing

their

names

to

the

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order.
While a number of other Conclusions of law could be similarly
reference, only one more will be addressed briefly here.

The

Securities Advisory Board found that "the [Johnsons'] dishonest and
unethical conduct was driven by a desire to realize monetary gain
and/or avoid financial loss and that [the Johnsons'] willingness to
engage in trading the securities shifted over time, depending upon
whatever

would

promote

[the

Johnsons']

Findings, Conclusions and Order, at R.1139.
concluded

that

" [b]y

reason

of

the

economic

interests.11

The Board therefore

serious

nature

of

[the

Johnsons'] misconduct, an appropriately severe sanction should be
entered."

Id., at R.1140. Once again, based upon the facts as set

forth in the Findings of Fact and in the Facts of the Case portion
of this brief, there is ample evidence that the Johnsons asserted
that any trading in U.S.A. Medical was illegal whenever they were
concerned about high buy-in prices, but gladly purchased the stock
in defiance of the Divisions' Stop Trading Order when doing so
would save them some $506,538.
20

Every significant Conclusion of Law is supported by ample
evidence, and the Conclusions of Law should be affirmed in their
entirety.

Point II: The Petitioners Have Failed to Meet Their Burden of
Establishing that there is an Unconstitutional Conflict between the
Division*8 Enforcement of its U.S.A. Medical Stop Trading Order and
the Petitioners' Obligations Under NASD Rules:

The heart of the Johnsons' appeal in this case is an argument
that the Divisions' Stop Trading Order, as applied to the Johnsons,
unconstitutionally conflicts with federal law in the form of NASD
Rules. This was the basis for the Petitioners' Rule 12(b)(1), Rule
12(b)(6) and Rule 56 Motions, and most of the points raised in the
Petitioners' Brief go to this argument, by focusing on various
alleged constitutional defects.18
The Johnsons' argument rests on two basic assumptions: First,
that the Johnsons, under the facts of the case, were required to
violate the Stop Trading Order in order to fulfill their NASD
requirements; and second that NASD rules have the force of federal
law and therefore preempt the Division's Stop Trading Order.

If

the Johnsons fail to establish the validity of either of these
assumptions, then most of the constitutional arguments raised in
their brief are inapplicable.
The Petitioners' Brief cites Article III, section 1 of the

18

Specifically, the following points in the Petitioners' Brief
are dependent on this argument to the degree that they cannot be
successfully raised if the argument is invalid: 2(A); 2(B); 2(C);
2(D); 2(E); 3; 4(A); 4(C); 4(D); 4(F); 4(H); and 4(N).

21

NASD Rules of Fair Practice, and Paragraph 1401 of the NASAA
Statements of Policy for the proposition that broker-dealers and
agents are required by both NASD and NASAA to "observe high
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of
trade."

NASD Manual, (CCH) f 2151 (1990); NASAA Reports, (CCH) f

1401 (1987).19

The Johnsons assert, without authority, that those

general standards required that they violate the Divisions' Stop
Trading

Order by purchasing U.S.A. Medical

residents

in

order

to

cover

their

"short"

shares

from Utah

position.

More

specifically, they contend that they could have been sanctioned by
NASD, or even expelled from NASD, for failing to cover their
"short" position by purchasing from Utah sellers.
The Johnsons have utterly failed to prove that they ran the
risk of any sanction by NASD if they did not purchase the U.S.A.
Medical stock. They offered not one single case in which a member
of NASD has been similarly sanctioned.20 Even the Johnsons' expert
witness at the administrative hearing, David King, had to admit

19

The Respondents agree that the Johnsons are held to those
standards; indeed, the Division suspended the Johnsons because
their dishonest and unethical behavior failed to comply with those
standards.
20

Indeed, the only evidence in the entire record that the
Johnsons were faced with NASD sanctions is Marlen Johnson's selfserving hearsay statement that Ken Schaeffer of NASD told him "that
we had to honor the contracts under any circumstances, or the NASD
would take charge and we would be fined." Hearing Transcript at
93.
Even assuming that Marlen Johnson correctly quoted Ken
Schaef fer, all NASD was requiring was that the Johnsons "honor the
contracts," which could be done by paying for stock bought-in on
their behalf. Given the total lack of evidence that the NASD had
any intention of trying to sanction the Johnsons for abiding by the
Division's Stop Trading Order, this entire issue should be
summarily resolved in favor of the Respondents.
22

that he knew of no case where NASD had sanctioned a member for a
failure to deliver securities.

Hearing Transcript, at 213-214.

There is a self-evident reason for this: Failure to deliver
a security, by itself, is not sanctionable by NASD.21

To the

contrary, the NASD Uniform Practice Code contains a lengthy and
detailed "buy-in" procedure, which is specifically designed to be
followed in the event that a seller fails to deliver a security.
NASD Manual (CCH) f 3559, et. seg. (1987).
Brief

concedes,

"[b]uy-ins

are

regular

As the Petitioners'
occurrences

in

the

securities brokerage business when a broker has not made timely
delivery" of stock to cover a short position. Petitioners' Brief,
at 12 n.ll.

All that the Johnsons had to do was allow buy-ins by

the parties that they had shorted, and the Johnsons could not have
been sanctioned by NASD; likewise, they would not have violated the
Divisions' Stop Trading Order.22
The Johnsons assert that they could not have allowed the buyins because the price of the buy-ins would have caused them to fall

21

There is another, equally self-evident reason.
It is
preposterous to presume that the NASD would sanction a member for
failing to purchase stock that could only be purchased illegally.
For example, if the Johnsons' position is correct, and no state law
can interfere with their overarching federal obligation to deliver
stock, and if the Johnsons knew of some stock that could only be
obtained by violating a probate order, or even by stealing preendorsed stock certificates, then under the Johnsons' reasoning,
federal law would require that the Johnsons violate the probate
order or steal the stock.
22

Johnson-Bowles owed the stock to out of state persons and
entities, who would not have been violating the Stop Trading Order
if they had purchased from out of state sellers.
23

below minimum capital requirements,23 which in turn would have
caused the NASD to have put them out of business. This is what the
Johnsons

really mean when

sanctions.

they refer to the threat

of NASD

The Johnsons' argument is flawed in three respects.

First, the evidence suggests that the price of the buy-ins
would not have been excessive.

The Johnsons purchased from at

least one New York resident at an acceptable price, and there is no
evidence in the record that buy-ins from other out of state
residents were not possible at similarly favorable prices.

See,

Stipulation of Facts for Purposes of Hearing, at R.1155.
Second, if buy-ins were made at a price that the Johnsons felt
was too high, they could have sought NASD arbitration24 as to the
reasonableness of that price, using the New York purchase to
establish the proper fair market price.
Third, and most importantly, even if the buy-in prices would
have been so high that they would have driven Johnson-Bowles out of
business, the Johnsons still would not have been entitled to
violate the Stop Trading Order.

The penny stock market is a

volatile place, and more than one brokerage house has gone out of
business because it found itself on the losing end of a major price

23

All broker-dealers are required to meet minimum capital
requirements in order to remain in business. See, 17 CFR 240.15c31 (1990); Utah Admin. Code R177-4-4 (1990). If a broker-dealer
falls below the allowed minimum, that broker-dealer will generally
be forced to shut down.
24

Which they were engaged in anyway as a result of Judge
Green's orders, with regard to the issue of whether they could
rescind their original short sales.
It would not have been
difficult to have also arbitrated the correctness of the price paid
for buy-in stock.
24

fluctuation.23

The law does not allow broker-dealers and agents

to violate Stop Trading Orders merely to avoid economic loss,
however severe.
In short, there is no reason to believe that the Johnsons
risked being sanctioned by NASD if they had refused to violate the
Stop Trading Order, but had agreed to allow the buy-ins.

The

Johnsons only faced NASD sanctions because of their poor economic
situation, which was not caused by the Division's order. There is
no conflict between enforcement of the Division's order and NASD
rules.
Finally, even if there were a conflict between the Stop
Trading Order and the NASD rules, the Johnsons have failed to
establish that the conflict must be resolved in favor of the NASD
rules and at the expense of state law.26 The NASD is not an agency
of the federal government; it is merely a self-regulating industry
organization that is authorized by federal law and subject to
monitoring by the SEC.

NASD rules are not promulgated by the

25

If the Johnsons' loss was due to fraud or market manipulation
by persons affiliated with U.S.A. Medical, the Johnsons' proper
remedy would be to sue those persons, not to violate the Division's
Stop Trading Order.
26

Section 28 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1924, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78bb(a), states that M[n]othing in this chapter shall
affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission . . . of any
State over any security or person insofar as it does not conflict
with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder." Thus, no implied preemption or comity argument is
possible with regard to security laws. Federal law only expressly
preempts directly conflicting state law; all other state law is
valid.
In this case, at most, the Johnsons are claiming an
indirect conflict based upon the specific nature of the facts in
this case. Such an incidental conflict is not sufficient to raise
a question of federal preemption under 15 U.S.C.A. S 78bb(a).

25

federal government, although the SEC can monitor those rules*

The

Johnsons have failed to cite even one federal case that says that
NASD rules have the force of federal law for purposes of conflict
of laws analysis.

By contrast, the Divisions' Stop Trading Order

is specifically authorized by Utah statute.
brief.

See, Point IV of this

It is a clear exercise of the state's police power to

prevent fraud and chaos in the state's penny stock market; the
state's powers are essentially identical to powers that the SEC has
at the federal level. Id.

The Johnsons have simply failed to show

that there is a basis for federal pre-emption, even assuming that
there was a real conflict between the NASD rules and state law.

Point III: The Respondents did not Err in Denying the Petitioners'
Many Motions;

The ALJ's order converting
the
informal to formal was correct.

administrative

procedure

from

This case began as an informal agency action, as defined by
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act27, on April 27, 1989.

On

May 24, 1989, the Division made a motion to convert the proceeding
from informal to formal under the Administrative Procedures Act.
(R.260.)

The Johnsons objected to the conversion, (R.251.) and a

hearing was held on June 5, 1989. (R.242.) The motion was granted
on July 14, 1989.

(R.174.)

The Johnsons object to the conversion on three grounds:

27

Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-l, et seg. (1989).
26

First, that the Division's own rules designate all adjudicative
proceedings as informal; second# that the conversion is not in the
public interest; and third, that conversion unfairly prejudiced the
Johnsons.
It is true that Utah Administrative Code Rule R177-46b-6B
(1990) states that "[a]ll adjudicative proceedings under the Act,
enumerated in this Rule, are designated as informal adjudicative
proceedings•" Nothing in that rule, however, prohibits a motion to
convert to formal proceedings.

By contrast, the Administrative

Procedures Act specifically provides for conversion:

Any time before

a final

order

is

issued

in

any

adjudicative
proceeding,
the presiding officer may
convert . . . an informal adjudicative proceeding to a
formal adjudicative proceeding if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in
the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3) (1989) (emphasis added).

Under the

express terms of that statute, the Division had a clear right to
seek conversion before a final order was issued.
The Divisions' motion was based upon a belief that conversion
of such a complex matter from an informal to a formal proceeding
was in the public interest.

Administrative Law Judge J. Steven

Eklund specifically found that:
Given the relative complexity of securities regulation,
expertise in the application and interpretation of the
statutes and rules which govern the securities industry
could prove to be invaluable to any fact finder charged
with the responsibility to determine whether certain
conduct is violative of the governing statutes and rules
in that regard. In fact, the existence and effectiveness
of agency adjudicative proceedings is primarily
predicated upon the exercise of such specialized skills
by boards and commissions similar to the Securities

27

Advisory Board. In light of the proposed agency action
incident to these proceedings, it is in the public
interest to conduct these cases on a formal basis.
(R.173.) Judge Eklund's findings are reasonable and rationalf and
should not be disturbed by this court.28
The Johnsons' claim that they were unfairly prejudiced because
they lost the right to a trial de novo in District Court is without
foundation. Once again, Judge Eklund's findings are reasonable and
rational:
[The Johnsons'] concern with costs which could be
incurred on appeal and the nature of judicial review from
any order entered in this forum implies that [the
Johnsons] believe the outcome of these proceedings is a
foregone conclusion.
Although the division has
undertaken proceedings which could prompt entry of a
disciplinary sanction against [the Johnsons], there is no
basis to conclude that [the Johnsons] will not be
accorded due process in these proceedings, whether
conducted on a formal or informal basis.
(R.173.) Further, because the motion to convert was brought in the
first month of this adjudicative process, Judge Eklund found that
the conversion "would not adversely affect the substantial rights
of either party."

Id.

The law allows conversion of an administrative action from
informal to formal, and the conversion in this case was in the
public interest and did not unfairly prejudice the Johnsons.
Therefore, the ALJ acted correctly in granting the Division's
motion to convert the proceedings to a formal status.

28

Although most of the issues raise under Point III of this
brief are subject to the "correction-of-error" standard of review,
the questions of whether conversion is in the public interest or
would unfairly prejudice the Johnsons are mixed questions of fact
and law, and should be subject to the "reasonable and rational"
standard of review.
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The ALJ properly

denied the Petitioners'

Rule 12(b)(1)

Motion.

On July 3, 1989, the Johnsons filed a motion to dismiss due to
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as referenced by section 63-46b1(4)(b) (1989) of the Administrative Procedures Act.

(R.239-241.)

The motion was denied by ALJ Eklund on August 27, 1989, after full
briefing and oral argument.

(R.149-153.)

The Johnsons have argued, on pages 25-36 of there brief, that
the motion should have been granted.

In support of that argument

they assert five closely related grounds, all of which go to the
question of whether the Division can sanction the Johnsons for
violating the Stop Trading Order in light of the alleged conflict
between that order and NASD requirements.

Point II of this brief

has already analyzed the substance of Johnsons claims of alleged
conflict between the Division's order and NASD requirements, and
has shown that the conflict exists solely in Johnsons' mind.29
Even

assuming

every

argument

in

pages

25-36

of

the

Petitioners' Brief were valid, however, they still do not add up to
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Even if the Johnsons were

entirely right as to their theory of the case, the Division would
still have jurisdiction to bring an administrative proceeding.30

29

Judge Eklund did address the substance of the Johnsons'
claims in his conclusions of law denying the Rule 12(b)(1) motion.
See,
R.150-152.
30

The case of Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates. Inc., 401 F. Supp.
1137 (D.C.N.Y. 1975), is illustrative. In that case the defendant
argued that the land deal over which it was being sued did not
involve a security under federal law and hence there was no subject

29

The Johnsons have moved to dismiss on the basis of a lack of
jurisdiction, where the allegation is merely one of lack of merit.
The issue of whether a court or agency has jurisdiction to decide
a matter and whether the specific claims of the case against a
defendant have merit are entirely severable and distinct issues.
See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice Civil 2d Section 1350 (1990).
This is a license suspension case.

Utah Code Annotated

section 61-1-6(1) (1989) allows the executive director, with the
approval of the Securities Advisory Board# to suspend broker-dealer
or agent licenses.
says

that

Procedures

Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-18.6 (1989)

the Division
Act

in

its

will

comply

adjudicative

with

the

Administrative

proceedings.

Utah

Code

Annotated section 63-46b-3 (1989) establishes the procedure for
commencing administrative proceedings under the Administrative
Procedures Act.

Notices of Agency Action were served on the

Johnsons in accordance with the requirements of section 63-46b-3.
(R.263-295.)

Those are the statutes and facts upon which subject

matter jurisdiction is based.

The claims raised by the Johnsons

have nothing to do with the basis for subject matter jurisdiction.

The ALJ vroverlv

denied the Petitioners'

Rule 12(b)(6)

Motion.

Petitioners offer a quiver-full of constitutional arguments in

matter jurisdiction in the federal court. The court rejected that
argument, informing the defendant that the merits of the claim were
properly raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and not in a claim that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.

30

Point 4 of their brief, which claims that Judge Eklund erred in
denying

their Rule 12(b)(6) Motion.

constitutional

error

raised

in

Most of the claims of

that

section

are

redundant,

unsupported with any authority and just plain a waste of this
Court's time and the Petitioners' paper.
the

Respondents

address

the

issues

Petitioners' brief as follows.

That having been said,

raised

in

Point

4

of

The equal protection and due

process arguments raised in Points 4(A) and (B) will be addressed
in Point IV of this brief.

The comity argument raised in Point

4(D) of Petitioners' brief has been addressed in Point II of this
brief, supra.

The arguments raised in Points 4(H) and (K) of

Petitioners' brief have been addressed in Section I of this brief,
supra.

The substance of the arguments raised in Points 4(1), (J),

and (L) will be addressed in Point IV of this brief, brief.
The remaining issues raised in Point 4 will be addressed here.
Those issues concern whether the Division's actions: deprived the
Johnsons of their "privileges and immunities," Point 4(C); made the
statute an ex post

facto

law, Point 4(E); interfered with the

Johnsons' right to contract, Point 4(F); or were based on an
unconstitutionally vague statute, Point 4(6). Respondents contend
that this Court should not even consider any of these issues,
however,

because

the

Johnsons

have

failed

to

make

legally

sufficient arguments, including citations to relevant authorities,
on each point.

Instead, the Petitioners' Brief simply raises bald

and cursory allegations.

Since the Petitioners' Brief does not

meet the standard required under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, this Court should summarily reject each of the
31

Johnsons' arguments cited at the outset of this paragraph.

See,

State v. Reiners, 151 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 22-23 n.2 (Utah App. Dec.
28, 1990); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989).

That

said, the Respondents offer the following analysis on each point.
Petitioners have not had their privileges and immunities violated.
In so far as Respondents can fairly discern it, Petitioners'
argument in Point 4(C) of their brief is that by suspending their
licenses, the Division violated their rights as federal citizens.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United State's Constitution
states: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
That language has been given its clear meaning: any state law
that purports to take away an inherent right of federal citizenship
is invalid. See, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).

The

rights inherent in federal citizenship are as follows: the right to
pass freely from state to state; the right to petition Congress for
the redress of grievances; the right to vote for federal officers;
the right to be protected against violence while in the custody of
federal marshals; the right to inform federal authorities of
violations of law; and the statutory right to hold property. See
Id.,

at 97; Ovama v. California. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
Of

course,

since Johnson-Bowles

is not

a

citizen,

privileges and immunities clause offers its no protection.

the
Nor

does it aid Marlen Johnson, since there is no inherent right to
sell securities that attaches to federal citizenship.
Petitioners also appear to claim that their privileges and
immunities

under Article

IV, Section 2 of the United
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States

Constitution have been violated. That argument is, if such a thing
is possible, even less meritorious than their Fourteenth Amendment
claim.
Article IV, Section 2 provides: "[the] Citizens of each state
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of Citizens
in the several States."

That language creates a concept of

national citizenship under which a citizen of state "A" who moves
to state MB" cannot be treated more harshly than citizens of state
M M

B

in general.

See,

Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).

Again, the provision is entirely inapplicable to JohnsonBowles, a corporate person but not a citizen, and inapplicable to
Marlen Johnson because he makes no claim even colorably close to a
valid argument under Article IV, Section 2.
The Order Suspending Petitioner's Licenses was not an ex post
Law.

facto

In Point 4(E), Petitioners argue that the order suspending
their licenses was an illegal ex post

facto

law under Article I,

section 10 of the United States Constitution.

Again, Petitioners

reveal a lack of even a basic familiarity with Constitutional
concepts.
First, the prohibition against ex post

facto

laws applies only

to the imposition of criminal penalties.

See,

Calder v.Bull. 3

U.S. 386 (1798) (ex post

facto

law prohibition inapplicable to

legislative act setting aside probate order); Galvan v. Press. 347
U.S. 522 (1954) (ex post

facto

prohibition has no application in

deportation proceedings since they are civil); Garrett Freight
Lines, Inc v. State Tax Commission, 135 P.2d 523 (Utah 1943)
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(neither Utah nor Federal Constitutions' prohibition against
post

facto

ex

laws prohibited after the fact taxation of lawful

business activity).
Moreover, even if the Johnsons had a liberty rather than a
property interest suspended by the Division, there still would have
been no violation of the prohibition against ex post
The

Division

suspended

the

Johnsons'

licenses

facto

laws.

because

they

committed a dishonest and unethical practice when they bought stock
in violation of a stop trading order.

Since it was illegal to

participate in dishonest or unethical practices and to trade in the
face of a stop trading order before Johnsons undertook to sell the
U.S.A. Medical shares short, and before they bought the stock in
violation of the order, their claim that they were the victims of
an ex post

facto

law is simply silly.

Petitioners' right to freedom from interference with contract was
not violated.
Since the Petitioners have not favored the Respondents or this
Court with any analysis or authority on Point 4(F) of their brief,
it is difficult to discern their argument on the point, let alone
refute it. It appears to the Respondents that the Petitioners are
claiming that they had a constitutional right to sell U.S.A.
Medical stock after the Division placed a stop trading order on it
because they had sold the shares short prior to the stop trading
order being entered.
That argument is frivolous. The freedom from interference to
contract

guaranteed

Constitution

by

Article

1,

and Article 1, Section
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Section

18

of

the

Utah

10 of the United States

Constitution does not deprive state administrative agencies of the
right to use the state's police power to regulate business. See,
United States Smelting v. Utah Power and Light Company, 197 P. 902
(Utah 1921) (regulation of the rates charged by a utility company
permissible even it interferes with contract rights).
There was nothing vague about the Division's Command that
Petitioners Not Trade shares covered by a stop trading order.
In reading Petitioners' argument in Point 4 (G) of their brief
it is easy to loose sight of what Petitioners did to warrant the
suspension of their licenses.

Petitioners had their licenses

suspended because, after they successfully convinced a federal
court judge that it was illegal to trade in shares of U.S.A.
Medical (on the theory that they were unregistered securities and
fraudulently issued) and after the Division had entered an order to
the same effect, and after the price of the securities had
plummeted, they purchased over 300,000 U.S.A. Medical shares.
Petitioners now come before this Court with straight faces and
assert that Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-6(1)(g) (1989), the
section that allows the Division to suspend the licenses of agents
and brokers who participate in "dishonest or unethical practices,"
and the rules promulgated thereunder, are unconstitutionally vague
as applied to them.

In their brief, Petitioners assert that the

standard under which the statute should be measured is one of
whether a "reasonably intelligent person" would have been able to
discern that his conduct was dishonest or unethical. Petitioners'
Brief, at 48.

That is not the correct standard.

In Brewster v.

Maryland Securities Commissioner, 548 A,2d 157 (Md. App. 1988), a
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case the Petitioners have tried in vain to distinguish, the court
held that in deciding whether the phrase Hdishonest and unethical
practices" was unconstitutionally vague, the phrase's reference in
business practice, custom and usage must be considered. Id. at 160.
The record in this case fully establishes that all reasonable
people in the securities industry knew that the Division's Order
was a total prohibition on the trading of U.S.A. Medical stock and
that violating it could result in a license suspension.

Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, at R.1136-1137 ("The proper
scope and operative effect of the March 1, 1989 Order entered by
the Division

was

to prohibit

any trading

Corporation Securities within this state").

of

U.S.A. Medical

That being the case,

there was nothing vague about the Division's interpretation that
Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-6(1) (g) (1989) prohibits violating
stop trading orders as an unethical or dishonest practice.
Moreover, even if the vagueness test is applied using a
reasonable person rather that a reasonable

securities broker

standard, there is still nothing vague about the statute and rules
as applied to the Johnsons by the Division. The Johnsons knew that
the stock in U.S.A. Medical was not exempt from registration and
indeed successfully convinced Judge Greene of the same. Hence they
knew that neither they nor any one else should be trading in it.
If that were not enough, the Petitioners were specifically told by
the Division's order that they were forbidden to trade in it. It
does not take a person of any more than average ability to discern
that trading in the stock under those conditions would be deemed a
dishonest or unethical thing to do.
36

The ALJ vroperlv

denied the Petitioners'

Rule 56 Motion.

The Johnsons filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

That motion was

denied, and the Johnsons claim that the denial was error.
The Johnsons complain that the only facts asserted to be in
dispute went to the question of "solicitation," which is immaterial
to

the

case,

and

they

further

complain

that

the

issue of

"solicitation" was not raised by competent affidavit, as required
under Rule 56.31
Rule

56 allows for summary

criterion are met:

judgment

in cases where two

First, that there are no disputed issues of

material fact; and, second, that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

See, Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Insurance

Co..

714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); Snvder v. Merklev, 693 P.2d 64 (Utah
1984).32

The Johnsons' motion failed to meet either criterion.

As the rest of this brief amply demonstrates, the Johnsons were not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Further, the key issue in
the case, whether the purchases by the Johnsons of U.S.A. Medical

31

The Division's memorandum opposing the summary judgment
motion contained evidence of solicitation in the form of an
affidavit by Dorothy Akin, an investigator for the Division, and in
the form of her memorandum to the file. Admittedly, the affidavit
is based on hearsay, and the memorandum is hearsay, but hearsay is
allowed in formal administrative proceedings and should therefore
by allowed in summary judgment motions. See, Utah Code Ann. S 6346b-8(l)(c) (1989).
32

Summary judgment should only be granted when it is clear from
the undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail.
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates. 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App.
1987); Brav Lines v. Utah Carriers Inc.. 739 P.2d 1115 (Utah App.
1987).
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stock after the Division imposed its Stop Trading Order constituted
"dishonest or unethical conduct" was certainly not undisputed.
Thus, the ALJ acted correctly in denying the Johnsons' motion for
summary judgment.

The Petitioners'
remaining
frivolous
or moot.

procedural

objections

are

either

The Johnsons assert in point 3 of the Petitioners' Brief that
then Division Director John Baldwin's Order on Agency Review of
October 30, 1989, with regard to Judge Eklund's order denying the
Johnsons' motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(1) was erroneous and
prejudicial.

This was the central issue in the case of Johnson-

Bowles Company v. Baldwin, No. 900210-CA (Utah App. January 29,
1991).

The Court held that the issue was moot, and the Court

specifically denied the Johnsons' motion to consolidate that case
with the case currently before the Court.

Therefore, this issue

has been resolved and no longer needs addressed.
The Johnsons claim, in point 6 of the Petitioners' Brief, that
then Division Director John Baldwin erred in issuing his Order on
Agency Review of April 9, 1990. That order denied further agency
review of the Johnsons' Rule 56 Motion on the grounds that denial
of that motion did not constitute a final agency action.

Even if

the Johnsons are right, and Director Baldwin should have allowed
further agency review at the time, the issue is now moot.

The

Johnsons received a full agency review by Executive Director David
L. Buhler of the Department of Commerce after the Division of
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Securities entered its final order, R.1129-1142. The Department of
Commerce then issued a detailed Order on Review, R.830-842, which
specifically reviewed the denial of the Johnsons' Rule 56 motion.
See, R.840-841.

Thus, the Johnsons' received the agency review

that they sought, and this issue is moot on appeal.
Point 8 of the Petitioners' Brief alleges error because the
Division ignored both the Johnsons' objection to the form and
content of the Divisions' final order, and the Johnsons' "Demand
for Disclosure of how and by whom the August 13, 1990, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was Prepared.33"

The Division

rightly ignored both motions, which are nothing more than a
spurious and frivolous attack on the integrity of the Security
Advisory Board and Judge Eklund.34

Further, the Johnsons waived

their objections when they failed to raise them at the agency
review before the Department of Commerce. Their request for review
does not include a request for review of the Division's failure to
act on either order.

The Department of Commerce even invited the

33

0f course, no such motion has ever been recognized tinder the
laws of this state or, to the best of counsel's knowledge, under
the laws of any state. It is not provided for in any rule, and
while courts have the right, in the furtherance of justice, to
entertain a wide range of motions not specifically provided for by
rule, there is no authority for requiring a court to entertain such
dross as this.
34

Assuming, arguendo, that people other than the Securities
Advisory Board, Judge Eklund, and former Director Baldwin were
involved in the process of drafting the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order (an assumption that is entirely
lacking in evidence, since the document may very well have been
drafted by a member of the Securities Advisory Board on a word
processor different from the one usually used by Judge Eklund),
that does not change the fact that the members of the Securities
Advisory Board, and Mr. Baldwin, approved the wording of the
document and signed their names to it.
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Johnsons to supplement their request for review, but the Johnsons
"declined the invitation and filed no more memoranda.-

Department

of Commerce Order on Review, R.832.
Point 9 of the Petitioners' Brief alleges that the Department
of Commerce's Order on Review is flawed simply because it failed to
overturn the final order of the Division of Securities.

This

argument adds nothing to the case; either the Division's final
order was correct, in which case so was the Order on Review, or it
was flawed, in which case so was the Order on Review. There is no
independent error claimed on the part of Executive Director Buhler,
the author of the Order on Review.

Point IV; The Divisions' U.S.A. Medical Stop Tradina Order was
valid at the time when the Petitioners purchased U.S.A. Medical
stock;
This Court should not even consider challenges to the validity
of The Division's Stop Trading Order.

The order was entered in

large part as a result of prompting by the Johnsons and because of
the Johnsons' evidence, put on in the Johnsons' Federal Lawsuit,
that U.S.A. Medical

stock

lacked trading exemptions

and was

fraudulently issued. The Johnsons received a copy of the Divisions
summary stop order as soon as it was entered, and that copy stated
that "notice is hereby given that within fifteen (15) days after
receipt of a written request, this matter will be set down for
hearing."

R.294.

Not surprisingly, the Johnsons, who were

40

benefiting from the stop trading order's existence,35 did not
request a hearing. When no hearing was requested, under the terms
of Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14(3) (1989) "the order will
remain in effect until it is modified or vacated by the executive
director."

The Division then issued its default

(permanent)

version of the Stop Trading Order, and the Johnsons were again
immediately provided with a copy.

Again not surprisingly, the

Johnsons did not take any action to try to lift the Stop Trading
Order.

Because the Johnsons were the parties who worked hard to

get the Stop Trading Order issued, and because they were routinely
admitting in both court and correspondence throughout the months of
February and March of 1989 that the U.S.A. Medical stock lacked all
exemptions and could not be legally traded,

they should be

estopped from attacking the validity of the order.

Further, they

waived their right to complain about the validity of the order when
they failed to request a hearing, and again when they took no
actions, not even a letter of protest, when notified that the order
had become permanent by default.
The Johnsons argue that, at most, the Division's stop trading
order could only have been valid for ten days, from March 1, 1989,
through March 10, 1989, and therefore, purchases of stock made by
them after March 10th could not have violated the order, or
constituted dishonest or unethical behavior on their part.

Of

course, that argument is only relevant if the Johnsons can show

35

Without the stop trading order it is highly improbable that
the price of U.S.A. Medical stock would have fallen to a fraction
of its pre-order value, thereby making it attractive for the
Johnsons to buy the stock.
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that all of their purchases took place after March 10th; if even
one purchase took place on or before that date, that purchase would
have been a sufficient basis for the Division's order*36

The

evidence, however, merely shows that all of the purchases took
place during March of 1989; there is no evidence as to the exact
dates in March.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that some of

the purchases may have taken place on or before March 10th.
Because the Johnsons have utterly failed to meet their burden of
introducing evidence that all of their purchases were begun and
completed after March 10th, this court should not even consider the
issue of whether the Division's Stop Trading Order could lawfully
last more than ten days.
Turning to the substance of the Johnsons' argument, it is
clear that they have confused two types of stop trading orders,
namely the ten day "suspension of trading" type of order and the
potentially permanent "denial of exemption from registration" type
of order.
The SEC can issue a "suspension of trading" type of stop
trading

order

under

the

authority

of

Section

12(k) of

the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. S 781(k), which reads
in part as follows:
If in its opinion the public interest and the protection
of investors so require, the Commission is authorized
summarily to suspend trading in any security (other than
an exempted security) for a period not exceeding ten
days, or with the approval of the President, summarily to

36

Actually, the S.E.C.'s suspension order expired on March 16,
1989. Since it would obviously have been dishonest or unethical to
violate that order, the Johnsons' must show that all of their
purchases took place after March 16th.
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suspend all trading on any national securities exchange
or otherwise, in securities other than exempted
securities, for a period not exceeding ninety days.
This suspension of trading type of stop trading order has several
unique characteristics, the most noteworthy of which is that it may
be entered by the SEC any time that "the public interest and the
protection of investors so require.H

Thus it may be used in an

almost unlimited variety of circumstances.

For example, if the

president and guiding force of a high-tech company suddenly dies,
the SEC could use its power to suspend trading and give the market
some cooling off time in order to prevent wild price instability.
Because the SEC's authority under this provision is so broad, and
essentially unreviewable, it is limited to ten days (or ninety,
with the President's concurrence).
By contrast, SEC Rule 261, Suspension of Exemption, under the
Securities Act of 1933, 17 CFR S 230.261

(1990) provides for

potentially permanent stop trading orders based upon the suspension
of exemptions from registration requirements.

It operates in much

the same manner as Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14 (1989),
which is the section relied upon by the Division in this case.37
Each provision operates to stop trading in a stock by denying the
availability of exemptions to the stock registration requirements.
Under each provision the order is originally temporary, but becomes

37

Rule 261 is very similar to the other stop order provision
in the Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-12
(1989). The primary difference between sections 61-1-12 and 61-114(3), is that the former section is limited to denying the
effectiveness of registration statements, while the latter section
is used for stop trading orders based upon the denial of exemptions
from registration.
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permanent if no hearing is requested within a set period of time.
See,

Rule 261(b) (MIf no hearing is requested . . . the order shall

become permanent on the thirtieth day after it entry and shall
remain in effect unless or until it is modified or vacated by the
Commission.H)
Thus, under a provision that is extremely similar to the
provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, the SEC does have
authority to stop trading in a stock permanently. Obviously, Utah
Code Annotated

section 61-1-14(3) does not conflict with the

federal law, and the Petitioners' claim that the Stop Trading Order
could not lawfully last for more than ten days is meritless.38

Point V:
Registration
Johnsons' on
Light of the

The Divisions' Order Suspending the Johnsons1
with the Division for One Year and Placing the
Probation for Two Years Thereafter was Reasonable in
Severity and Willful Nature of the Johnsons' Conduct:

The facts of this case, and the analysis contained in the
prior portions of this brief, should be sufficient to establish

38

So is the related argument that a permanent stop trading
order constitutes an unlawful taking of property, an argument that
should be rejected out of hand because the Petitioners have failed
to support it with any authority or more than the most general
argument. State v. Reiners, 151 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 22-23 n.2 (Utah
App. Dec. 28 1990); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah
1989).
Of course, under a stop trading order there is only a
suspension of the right to trade the stock, not a "taking" of the
right to own the stock (and to receive dividends, vote at
shareholders' meetings, etc.). Further, the Johnsons waived their
right to object to the propriety of the alleged taking when they
failed to request a hearing.
Finally, even a permanent stop
trading order is subject to modification or vacation, something
that the Johnsons have never sought in this case. See, Utah Code
Ann. S 61-1-14(3) (1989).

44

that the Division did not abuse its discretion in placing the
Johnsons on one year's suspension followed by two year's probation.
The

Johnsons' behavior

constituted

as direct

and willful a

violation of a Division order as can be imagined. Not only did the
Johnsons know about the order, they were largely responsible for
its issuance.

They also profited handsomely from violating the

order, to the tune of more than $500,000.
Advisory

Board

and

John

Baldwin

put

it

As the Securities
in

the

Divisions'

Conclusions of Law:
[E]ntry of a disciplinary sanction in this proceeding is
in the public interest and clearly warranted due to [the
Johnsons'] non-compliance with the March 1, 1989 Order
which was duly entered to regulate the trading of U.S.A.
Medical Corporation Securities. The record reflects that
Respondents' dishonest and unethical conduct was driven
by a desire to realize monetary gain and/or avoid
financial loss and that [the Johnsons'] willingness to
engage in trading the securities shifted over time,
depending upon whatever would promote [their] economic
interests.
Adherence to orders duly entered by the
Division which govern the practices of broker-dealers and
against engaged in the securities business should not be
a matter dictated by the potential for monetary gain. By
reason of the serious nature of [ the Johnsons']
misconduct, an appropriately severe sanction should be
entered.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, at R.1139-1140.
Under the circumstances of this case, the penalty meted out was not
an abuse of discretion by the Division.39

39

Likewise, the Johnson's claim that the Division's actions
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, section 1, is baseless. That
argument, which like so many others cites no legal authority (and
should therefore be summarily dismissed) is premised on the belief
that the Division singled out the Johnsons for punishment. In
fact, two of the masterminds behind U.S.A. Medical, Jim Averett and
Roger Coleman have pled guilty to related crimes (Averett received
probation; Coleman will be sentenced soon, and prison time is
expected). Paul Jones is still facing disciplinary action (the
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CONCLUSIONS THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD AFFIRM THE RESPONDENTS'
ACTIONS IN ALL REGARDS:

Under the facts of this case, looking at the record as a
whole, the Division acted reasonably and rationally in suspending
the licenses of Johnson-Bowles and Marlen Johnson for one year and
placing them on a two year suspension.

This Court should uphold

the Division's actions.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of April, 1991.
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only reason his case has been inactive so long is the lack of
resources to pursue it, caused largely by the many frivolous
motions and grounds for appeal raised by the Johnsons). As for the
parties that transacted trades in U.S.A. Medical on March 1, 1989,
there is no clear evidence that they knew of the Division's order
before they executed their trades. Of course, the Johnsons were
unique in that they originally urged the Division to issue the Stop
Trading Order, and then proceeded to violate that order once the
price of U.S.A. Medical stock had fallen dramatically.
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